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Abstract: We consider two mechanisms to procure differentiated goods: a request 
for quote and an English auction with bidding credits.  In the request for quote, 
each seller submits a price and the inherent quality of his good. Then the buyer 
selects the seller who offers the greatest difference in quality and price.  In the 
English auction with bidding credits, the buyer assigns a bidding credit to each 
seller conditional upon the quality of the seller’s good.  Then the sellers compete 
in an English auction with the winner receiving the auction price and his bidding 
credit.  Game theoretic models predict the request for quote is socially efficient 
but the English auction with bidding credits is not.  The optimal bidding credit 
assignment under compensates for quality advantages, creating a market 
distortion in which the buyer captures surplus at the expense of the seller’s profit 
and social efficiency.  In experiments, the request for quote is less efficient than 
the English auctions with bidding credits.  Moreover, both the buyer and seller 
receive more surplus in the English auction with bidding credits. 
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JEL Classifications: C7, C9, L1 
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I.  Introduction 
 
    Large enterprises procure many goods for which the alternatives differ in quality.  Often in 
such situations, the sellers find it neither feasible nor profitable to modify the non-price attributes 
of their goods.  Some examples are the procurement of office furniture, hotel stays, and contract 
software programming.  Traditionally, such goods are bought via a Request For Quote ( here 
after RFQ). 
    As part of their e-procurement agendas, many enterprises search for mechanisms that will 
provide better combinations of quality and price than does the RFQ.  Most of these searches lead 
to an English auction.1  The promise to deliver the lowest cost seller through cutthroat price 
competition entices the enterprise.  Unfortunately, when goods vary in quality, this aspect of an 
English auction can undermine the enterprise’s efforts: often the lowest cost seller doesn’t 
provide the best combination of price and quality.  To address this issue, we introduce a stage 
prior to the English auction in which the buyer can assign bidding credits to sellers.  Our primary 
concern is whether an enterprise’s interest is better served by the English auction with bidding 
credits (henceforth EBC) or the RFQ. 
Our research is part of the IBM procurement organization’s evaluation of online auctions to 
procure differentiated goods.  While the theory and experiments in this paper use abstract 
labeling for the economic environment, the focus of our activities is on the procurement of 
contract software programming.  The numerical examples we provide and experimental 
parameter values we use are based upon this market.2  For this perspective the RFQ is the 
baseline for current practice while the EBC is an alternative we speculate is easy to implement, 
has good theoretical performance, and has a dominant strategy suppliers are likely to adopt.   
    A RFQ starts with the buyer providing her evaluation criteria for the non-price attributes, i.e. 
how she measures quality, to potential sellers.  The buyer provides the evaluation criteria, even 
though the non-price attributes of a good are fixed.  This way a seller knows the quality level 
assigned to his good. 3  Next, each seller sets a price and provides the fixed description of his 
                                                 
1 Within the e-procurement community the English auction is often called the Reverse auction.  
2 There are several website with auctions for contract programming services.  Some examples are 
www.freelance.com and www.guru.com. 
3 Hence, we are not considering the buyer making a strategic choice of evaluation functions for RFQ’s as in studies 
such as Dasgupta and Spulber (1990) and Che (1993). Furthermore, we don’t address the issue of whether a buyer 
should reveal private information about this demand as in studies like Tan (1996) and Rezende(2009).  
 2
product.  The buyer, then, selects the seller who offers the largest margin between quality and 
price. The winning seller receives his submitted price.   
    In our formulation of the RFQ as a game of incomplete information, we define a seller’s type 
as his realized surplus – quality minus cost – and a seller’s bid as a surplus offer – quality minus 
price.  Under this formulation, the RFQ is equivalent to a first price sealed bid auction for selling 
an object to potential buyers with independent private values.4  A seller’s realized surplus in a 
RFQ is equivalent to a buyer’s private value in a standard first price sealed bid auction; both are 
the potential gains from exchange that the auction participant provides.  A surplus offer in a RFQ 
is equivalent to a buyer’s bid in a first price sealed bid auction; both are an offer of utility by the 
bidder to the auctioneer.  We exploit this equivalence to derive a symmetric Nash equilibrium for 
the RFQ.  The symmetric equilibrium strategy is a surplus offer function that is an increasing 
function of realized surplus, ensuring the seller with the highest realized surplus wins and the 
auction is socially efficient.5  
    In an EBC, as in the RFQ, the buyer provides the evaluation criteria to the sellers, who in turn 
provide their product descriptions.  Observing the quality of each good, the buyer assigns a 
bidding credit to the seller of each good.  Then the sellers, each with bidding credit in hand, 
compete in an English auction.  In the auction, sellers offer successively lower prices until the 
winning seller submits a price that no other seller is willing to improve upon.  Again the winning 
seller receives the auction price and his bidding credit. 
    We derive the equilibrium strategies of the EBC by using a backward induction approach.  For 
any bidding credit assignment, a seller’s optimal strategy is to exit the auction when the price 
falls below his cost less his bidding credit. Anticipating the sellers following this strategy, the 
buyer’s optimal bidding credit rule is discriminatory.  In the case of two sellers, although the 
buyer assigns a larger credit to the seller of the higher quality good, the credit is smaller than his 
quality advantage.  The buyer’s optimal rule is reminiscent of the discriminatory policies of 
optimal auctions when sellers have asymmetric cost distributions.6  In these optimal auctions and 
                                                 
4 First analyzed in a non-cooperative equilibrium framework by Vickrey (1961). 
5 This change of variable approach has been successfully and independently used in two recent papers on 
procurement with design tournaments: Fullerton et al. (2002) and Che and Gale (2002). In both of the papers, 
suppliers participate in a design contest to determine quality and then the enterprise uses and auction to purchase the 
innovation. Englebrecht-Wiggans, Haruvy, and Katok (2007) also use this approach for the same setting as ours. 
6 Myerson (1981), MacAfee and McMillan (1989), and Bulow and Roberts (1989) derive the optimal auctions for 
procurement when sellers have asymmetric costs. 
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the EBC, the optimal discriminatory policies promote competitive pressure by subsidizing the 
disadvantaged seller and enrich the buyer at the expense of sellers’ profits and social efficiency. 
    Our experimental results differ from the game theoretic predictions.  In our experiments, the 
EBC is more socially efficient, providing a better average outcome to both the seller and buyer 
than the RFQ provides.  In the RFQ experiments, many subjects’ choices don’t correspond to the 
Nash equilibrium strategy.  The Nash equilibrium strategy of our RFQ is non-linear and other 
studies, such as Chen and Plott (1998), Georee and Offerman (2002), Pezanis-Christou (2002), 
and Guth et al. (2005), demonstrate that subjects tend not to play non-linear Nash equilibrium 
strategies.   
Our EBC experiments are similar to the experiments of Cornes and Schotter (1999) that 
consider sealed bid procurement auctions that use price preferences to promote minority 
representation.  Cornes and Schotter use fixed levels of the price preference as their treatment 
variable. They find the level of minority representation increases with the level of the price 
preference, but procurement costs are minimized at some interior level of the price preference.  
In our experiments we allow the buyer to choose the bidding credits.  Buyers select 
discriminatory bidding credits, but not as discriminatory as advocated by the optimal bidding 
credit rule.  The combination of the sellers’ non-equilibrium behavior in the RFQ and the buyer’s 
overly generous bidding credits in the EBC gives rise to the outcome of the EBC Pareto 
dominating the outcome of the RFQ. 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. (2007) is a theoretical and experimental study closely related to 
this one. They also consider procurement for differentiated goods with exogenous quality, and 
they compare the RFQ, which they call the buyer-determined auction, and a first price sealed bid 
price auction, which they call the price-determined auction. Their theoretical analysis shows that, 
under Nash equilibrium, with a small number of suppliers and little correlation between cost and 
quality, the price based auction provides more benefit to the procurement organization than the 
RFQ does. This is a result that applies to our setting and shows that even if a buyer assigns zero 
bidding credits in the English auction, he should do better than the RFQ. Empirically, 
Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. develop an ingenious experiment in which quality and cost are 
positively correlated in such a way that equilibrium bid functions are linear.  As a result, their 
RFQ auction is slightly more efficient than ours, but surprisingly not by much. In their first price 
sealed bid auction, they observe over aggressive and heterogeneous bidding that is typical in 
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these types of auctions. In contrast to this in our EBC, suppliers bid very closely to the dominant 
strategy.  
Haruvy and Katok (2008) adopt the Engelbrecht-Wiggans et al. setting to compare the 
performance of the RFQ versus a dynamic buyer determined English auction. This study is 
significant because the buyer determined English auction is the most common auction form used 
in online procurement auctions. The rather surprising result is that the RFQ soundly outperforms 
this auction in their experiments. This result, combined with the results presented in the current 
paper - namely the EBC generate a better outcome than the RFQ for both buyers and suppliers - 
demonstrates strong potential for the EBC as a powerful procurement tool.  
 
II. Game Theoretic Models and Predictions 
 
    In our analysis and experiments, we consider the case of two sellers and a buyer.  Levels of 
cost and quality characterize a seller.  Seller i’s cost to produce a unit is a random variable, 
denoted ci, which is uniformly distributed on the interval [cL,  cH].  A seller incurs this cost only 
when he makes a sale.  The quality of seller i’s good is a random variable, denoted vi, which is 
uniformly distributed on the interval [vL, vH].  You can think of this quality as the buyer’s 
maximum willingness-to-pay for the good.  The cost and the quality of each seller’s good are 
independent random variables.  We ensure that the quality of a seller’s good always exceeds its 
cost by assuming vL ≥  cH.  At the time of the auction, each seller knows his quality and cost, but 
only the distributions of the quality and cost of the other seller’s good.  Also, the buyer knows 
the quality of each seller’s good but only the distribution of his costs.  This information structure 
is common knowledge.  
    Two of our assumptions merit additional comments.  First, consider the assumption that both 
the buyer and supplier observe the quality of the supplier.  In our study, quality differences 
between suppliers are the differences in the buyer’s willingness-to-pay for each supplier’s good.  
The dubious aspect of this assumption is that the supplier observes what is private information 
held by the buyer.  Whether the supplier knows this information has no impact in the EBC, as a 
supplier’s behavior does not depend upon his quality.  This assumption does remove influential 
uncertainty from the RFQ, but this should lead to a more positive assessment of the RFQ than if 
this uncertainty was incorporated.  The second assumption is the independence of a supplier’s 
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quality and cost.  For the case of contract software programming, quality differences arise from 
idiosyncratic attributes such as the programmer’s location, the timing of his availability, or the 
extent of his experience in a particular industry.  It is likely in other applications of our results 
that quality and cost will be correlated.  Our theoretical analysis is conceptually easy to extend to 
incorporate correlation, and we describe how this is done at the appropriate point.  We do leave 
open the important question of how the correlation between quality and cost impacts behavior. 
  
II.1 Request For Quote Auction 
 
    In this mechanism, potential sellers simultaneously submit prices.  Seller i’s submitted price is 
denoted pi.  Seller i wins the auction if vi- pi is the maximum of {v1 - p1, v2 - p2} and receives the 
price pi.  In the case of a tie, a seller is selected at random from the set of winning suppliers.  The 
winning seller i’s profit is pi- ci, the other seller’s profit is zero, and the buyer’s payoff is vi- pi. 
    Although a seller i’s type is the pair (vi, ci), the relevant economic information is simply the 
difference of the two variables.  The potential gains from exchange seller i provides is si = vi- ci.  
We call si seller i’s “realized surplus.”  The random variable si has a distribution function, 
denoted F( ), which is the convolution vi and -ci.7  Instead of explicitly considering the submitted 
price, we consider seller i’s  “surplus offer,” oi = vi – pi.  Under this formulation, the seller who 
offers the buyer the largest surplus offer wins the RFQ auction.  
    With this change of variables, the RFQ has the same formulation as a first price sealed bid 
auction used to sell a single object to buyers with private values.  In such a setting, each buyer’s 
value is her realized surplus, or the potential gains from exchange she provides (assuming the 
seller has a cost of zero).  When a participant makes a bid, she is making a surplus offer to the 
seller.  And the highest bid is simply the greatest surplus offer.  The equivalence of the RFQ, 
under the change of variables, and the first price sealed bid auction allows us to one to derive a 
symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium using standard arguments such as those found in McAfee 
and McMillan (1987).   
    The symmetric Bayes-Nash equilibrium surplus offer function for the RFQ is 
                                                 
7 If quality and cost are correlated then we would derive the distribution of realized surplus by using the multivariate 
transformation theorem. 
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This expression calculates how much of seller i’s realized surplus he offers in equilibrium.  From 
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This expression provides the margin demanded by the seller as a function of cost and quality.  
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    Consider the following example, which is based upon the parameters of our experiment. Let  
[cL,  cH] = [40, 80] and [vL, vH]= [100, 130].  Then the distribution of realized surplus, si, is 
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The equilibrium surplus offer and bid functions are depicted in Figure 1.  After deriving a 
sequential Nash equilibrium of the EBC we will present some of the economic implications of 
this symmetric Nash equilibrium. 
 
 
II.2 English Auction with Bidding Credits 
 
     We show that that the English Auction with bidding credits is an optimal auction; no 
other feasible non-cooperative mechanism provides a higher expected value for the procurement 
official. As above, we reformulate the situation as one in which suppliers have individual 
potential gains from exchange, and can offer surpluses to the buyer. In the more general sense 
the buyer, conditional upon his information, wants to design a mechanism that which selects a 
supplier and compensation that maximizes his expected benefit and at the same time is incentive 
compatible and feasible with the suppliers.  
 We once again exploit the change of variable that allows us to express the procurement 
problem into one where the supplier’s types are potential gains from exchange. Since the buyer 
knows his maximum willingness-to-pay for each supplier i’s unit, his belief about si is F(si| vi). 
Myerson (1981) introduced the revelation principle: for any auction mechanism there is an 
equivalent direct revelation mechanism -- a game in which each i‘s action space is his set 
possible types and all players truthfully reporting is a Nash equilibrium -- which yields the same 
expected payoffs. Thus we can search for the optimal mechanism in the class of direct revelation 
games. Myerson shows that the optimal mechanism involves evaluating each revealed type,  ݏప෥ 
according to the following rule 
ݎ௜ሺݏప෥ሻ ൌ ݏప෥ െ
1 െ ܨሺݏప෥|ݒ௜ሻ
݂ሺݏప෥|ݒ௜ሻ
 
  
There are two stages in this mechanism.  In the first stage, the buyer assigns a bidding 
credit to each seller, conditioning it upon the seller’s quality.  Seller i’s bidding credit is denoted 
bi.  In the second stage of the auction, each seller is told his respective bidding credit and then the 
sellers participate in an English auction.  The winning seller receives a monetary amount equal to 
the auction price and his assigned bidding credit. 
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    We now derive a sequential Nash equilibrium for this mechanism.  Each of a seller’s 
information sets in stage two is defined by his bidding credit and the cost and quality of his good.  
A seller i’s behavioral strategy is to set an exit price, ei, for the English auction, i.e. the 
continuation game, at each of his information sets.  Also we require that the seller update his 
belief about the other seller’s type at each of his information sets via Baye’s Rule.  This is only a 
formality because each seller has a weakly dominant strategy.  
 
Proposition 1: Seller i has a weakly dominant strategy: ei*(bi, ci, vi) = ci – bi. 
 
In other words seller i remains in the auction as long as the standing price is greater than or equal 
to the seller’s cost less his assigned bidding credit. 
 
Proof: Apply one of the standard arguments, such as Krishna (2002) p.15, that establish the 
weakly dominant strategy in the second price sealed bid or English auctions.  Just recalibrate the 
seller’s zero payoff price to his cost less his bidding credit. 
 
Now we derive the buyer’s optimal bidding credit assignment in stage one.  At this point, one 
could be tempted to simply appeal to the famous optimal mechanism literature result, Myerson 
(1982), which states for this example you give a bidding credit equal to half the quality 
advantage in conjunction with quality specific reserve price, and then show that the EBC 
implements this. Unfortunately, we can’t make that appeal as we are requiring that procurement 
official makes a purchase. In the absence of reserve prices, this simple bidding credit is no longer 
optimal.  So we must proceed to directly calculate to optimal bidding credit rule. 
 
A buyer’s payoff is the difference between the quality and the price paid (auction price plus 
bidding credit) of the procured object.  The buyer’s expected payoff8 for a pair of bidding credits 
- when sellers adopt their dominant strategies - is 
 ( )[ ] [ ] ( )( )
[ ] ( )( )221211122211
12112221221121
|Pr
|Pr,
bbbccbcEvbcbc
bbbccbcEvbcbcbbE
−−+>−−−>−+
−+−>−−−≤−=Π
 or 
 
                                                 
8 If quality and cost were correlated we would express the expectation of each cost term also to be conditional upon 
the corresponding quality. 
 9
( )[ ] [ ] ( )( )
[ ] ( )( )212121122211
12211221221121
|Pr
|Pr,
bbbbcccEvbcbc
bbbbcccEvbcbcbbE
−+−+>−−>−+
−++−>−−≤−=Π
 . 
 
Inspection of this payoff function reveals that there are payoff equivalent strategy classes for the 
buyer: two pairs of bidding credits (b1, b2) and (b’1, b’2) yield the same expected payoff if b1 - b2 
= b’1 - b’2.  Let K be the set of payoff equivalent strategies with the typical element k, where 
( ){ }kbbbbKk =−=∈ 2121 :, .  From this point, when we consider a particular k we will be 
considering the unique bidding credit pair for which at least one of the suppliers receives a 
bidding credit of zero.  With this notation, the buyer’s expected payoff function is 
 
(1) 
( )[ ] [ ] ( )( )
[ ] ( )( ).|Pr
|Pr
211221
122121
kkcccEvckc
kkcccEvckckE
++>−>−+
−−>−≤−=Π
  
 
    The term [ ]21Pr ckc ≤− is the probability that seller one wins the auction.  This corresponds to 
the probability of the event { }21 ckcA ≤−= .  The figure below show the two shapes this event 
can take in the support of ( )21 ,cc . 
With a rectangular distribution on the support, the probability that seller one wins the auction is 
 
(2) [ ]
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )⎪⎪⎩
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⎧
−
+−
≥−
−−−−
=≤−
otherwise  ,
2
0 if  ,
2
2
Pr
2
2
2
22
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LH
LH
LH
LHLH
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kcc
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cc
kcccc
ckc .  
 
Case 1: k> 0 Case 2: k< 0 
C1 
cL+k 
C1 
cL cH cH cL 
cL-k 
C2 
cH 
A
cH-k 
C2 
A
cH 
cH+k 
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C2 
    Start with the case 0≥k .  When seller one wins the auction the expected auction price is 
( )0 ,| 122 ≥−≥ kkcccE .  To calculate this expectation we need the probability density function 
for the auction price.  The cumulative distribution function for the auction price is 
(3) ( ) { }( ) { } { }( ){ }( ) .Pr
Pr|Pr
12
122
122 kcc
kccyckccycyG −≥
−≥∩≤=−≥≤≡   
Recall { }21 ckcA ≤−=  and let { }ycB ≤= 2 .  The figure below shows the relevant events in the 
support of (c1, c2) for the case where k ≥ 0. 
 
 
 
 
 
Direct calculation yields 
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Substitution of (2) and (4) into (3) gives us 
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Differentiate this expression to obtain the density function of y: 
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The expected value of c2 conditional upon k and seller one winning the auction is 
y 
C2 
cH 
cH-k 
y 
C1 
cH 
cL 
A
cL+k 
When cH-k ≤y≤cH 
B
A∩B 
When cL≤y≤cH-k 
cH 
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B C1 
cH-k A
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The first term in this expression is the expectation of the first order statistic of the draw of two 
costs and the second term is the deviation from this expectation as k changes.   
    For the parameters of our experiment, 
( ) ( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
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122 801600
401
3
660 ,|
kk
kkkkcccEyE . 
One consistency check on this expression is to set k=0, i.e. the special case of a simple English 
auction.  When k=0, the expected value of the auction price conditional upon seller one winning 
is the expected value of the maximum cost statistic, 3266 .  A second consistency check is to set 
k=40 and guarantee that seller one wins the auction.  Here the expected value of y is 60, the 
unconditional expectation of seller two’s cost. 
    Now we calculate the expected price when seller two winning the auction, i.e. 
( )0 ,| 211 ≥≥− kckccE .  In this instance, 
{ }( ) ( )( )2
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One can verify these probabilities from the following diagram. 
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y y
c2 
 12
The cumulative distribution function of the auction price when seller two wins is 
( ) ( )
( )⎪⎩
⎪⎨
⎧
≤≤+−−
−−
+≤
=
Hl
LH
L
L
cykc
kcc
kcy
kcy
yG  if ,
  if              ,0
2
2 . 
This is the CDF of the maximum statistic for two independent draws from a uniform distribution 
on the interval [cL+k, cH], permitting us to state: 
(6) ( ) kcckckccE LH 3
1
3
1
3
20 ,| 211 ++=≥≥− .   
After substituting (2), (5), and (6) into (1) and simplifying, the buyer’s expected payoff function 
for 0≥k  is 
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    Let’s consider the case where k<0.  The symmetry of the probability and conditional 
expectation calculations allows us to immediately state the expected payoff in this case: 
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    Without loss of generality, assume seller one is the seller with the higher quality good.  The 
following lemma indicates that is never in the buyer’s interest to give a larger bidding credit to 
the lower quality seller, i.e. choose k<0. 
Proposition 2: ( )[ ] ( )[ ]0|0 <Π>Π kkEE . 
Proof:  
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The term ( ) ( )( )
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negative k reduces the probability of seller one winning below one-half.  Also the term 
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 is strictly positive.  Finally the term 
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( )[ ] ( )[ ] 00|0 >>Π−Π kkEE .  Q.E.D. 
 
    With this proposition, we examine the case of k≥0 for the optimal bidding credit assignment 
k*. The first order condition for the maximization of the buyer’s payoff is  
( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) 0
4
*3*2* 2121
2
=−−+−+−−=Π vvcckvvcck
dk
kdE LHLH . 
The second order condition is 
( )[ ] ( ) ( ) 0
4
3*4* 21
2
2
≤−−−−=Π vvcck
dk
kEd LH . 
The first order condition is a quadratic.  Of the two roots, only the negative one satisfies the 
second order conditions for the maximum.  The negative root and optimal bidding credit rule is 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( )
.
4
833
* 21
2
2121 vvccvvccvvcck LHLHLH
−−−−+−−−+−=  
Proposition 3: The optimal bidding credit assignment is less than the differences in quality, i.e. 
21* vvk −< . 
Proof: ⇒−<     )(* 21 vvk  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) ⇒<−−−−+−−−−−    08333 2122121 vvccvvccvvcc LHLHLH  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ⇒−+−−−−<−−−−−− 221212221212 29 9189 vvvvccccvvvvcccc LHLHLHLH  
( )( ) ( ) 01016 22121 <−−−−− vvvvcc LH . Q.E.D. 
 
    According to proposition three, the buyer’s best strategy in the EBC is to use a discriminatory 
rule that assigns a bidding credit to the high quality seller that is less than his quality advantage. 
 14
The impact of the rule bolsters the low quality seller’s competitiveness and leads the high quality 
seller to receive lower expected surplus than in the RFQ.   
    Again consider the environment of our experiment; two sellers who independently and 
uniformly draw costs from the interval [40, 80] and qualities from the interval [100, 130].   After 
the buyer observes each seller’s quality, has assigns to the higher quality seller the bidding credit  
( ) ( )
.
4
1280040120
*
2
2121 +−+−−+= vvvvk    
An inefficient outcome occurs when the high quality seller’s costs is in the interval  
[c2 + k*, c2 + (v1 – v2)].  For example, if (v1, c1)=(120,60) and (v2, c2)=(110, 55) seller one has the 
greatest realized surplus but seller two wins the EBC.  Specifically, the buyer assigns the optimal 
bidding credit of 1.58 to seller one, and seller two wins the auction at a price of 58.42.   
 
II.3 Economic Performance 
 
    Using the Nash equilibrium strategies for the RFQ and EBC we can generate theoretical 
predictions of economic variables such as efficiency, market price, the average quality and cost 
of the procured good, and buyer’s welfare.  Table I presents the expected values of various 
economic variables for the economic environment of our experiment.  Each of the following 
variables is associated with one the columns in Table II: “% of Efficient Outcomes” or the 
percentage of auctions that select the seller with the greatest difference between quality and cost, 
“Avg. Realized Surplus” or the sum of the buyer’s surplus and the winning seller’s profit, “Avg. 
Winning Seller’s Quality,” “Avg. Auction Price” (for the EBC this is the auction price and 
bidding credit paid), “Avg. Winning Seller’s Cost,” “Avg. Buyer’s Surplus” or the winning 
seller’s quality less total price paid, and “Avg. Wining Seller’s Profit.”  We obtained all of the 
expected values, except “% of Efficient Outcomes” for the RFQ, by simulating each auction ten 
million times.  
    The predicted outcomes of the two mechanisms differ for many variables.  The RFQ always 
generates a socially efficient outcome because the symmetric Nash equilibrium strategy is 
strictly increasing in realized surplus.  In contrast, the EBC selects the inefficient seller over 16 
percent of the time.  Also, the buyer’s discriminatory bidding credit assignments reduce the 
average winning seller quality.  Of course, the EBC more than makes up for this lower quality 
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with a reduced price and a bias towards the lower cost seller.  Also, the EBC leads to a gain in 
buyer welfare and a reduction in seller profit.  
    From a theoretical perspective, the EBC better serves the buyer’s interest than the standard 
RFQ.  But does human behavior conform to the models used to derive our predictions?  Past 
experimental studies show that human choice often differs from game theoretic predictions and 
we will see this occur again in our experiments. 
 
III. Experimental Design 
 
    All of our experimental sessions, except one, were conducted via a computer software 
application at the UCSD Department of Economics EEXCL facility.  We conducted the other 
session at the IBM TJ Watson Research facility.  Every session was a RFQ or EBC session. 
    Each subject received a show up fee of five US dollars prior to participating in a session 
(except for the IBM session at which a twenty dollar payment was given.)  Before the decision-
making portion of a session, each subject read a paper copy of the instructions and then had to 
successfully complete a simple written test of how the auction worked and how earnings were 
calculated.  After the experiment each subject was privately paid his or her earning in US 
currency. 
    In a RFQ session, all subjects were designated as sellers.  The subjects participated in five 
practice periods with no payments and then fifty additional periods with cash payments 
proportional to their experimental earnings.  Prior to each period, subjects were randomly paired 
to participate in different auctions.  At the start of each period, each subject was informed of his 
or her quality and cost.  Then, each seller privately submitted a price, and a winner was 
determined.  Subjects were informed of whether they won the auction, the winning auction price, 
and their period earnings.  A complete history of this information was always available to a 
subject. 
    In an EBC session, two-thirds of the subjects were randomly designated sellers and one-third 
of the subjects were randomly assigned to the buyer roll.  After two practice periods, subjects 
participated in twelve to sixteen periods in which cash earnings accumulated.9  Before each 
                                                 
9 An EBC auction lasted significantly longer than a RFQ auction, and consequently we used and 20 experimental 
dollar to one US dollar exchange rate in EBC sessions and a four to one exchange rate in the RFQ sessions. 
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period, a collection of trios was formed by randomly matching two sellers and one buyer.  Each 
trio participated in their own auction.  At the beginning of an auction, the buyer was informed of 
the quality of each seller’s good, and each seller was informed of the quality and unit cost of his 
or her good.  Then the buyer had the opportunity to assign a credit to each of the sellers.  Once 
these credits were assigned, they were revealed to the respective sellers.   
    Next, an iterative English auction commenced with sellers making opening offers.  In 
subsequent iterations, the seller who didn’t have the lowest current offer could either exit the 
auction or make an offer lower than the current lowest offer.  The seller with the current lowest 
offer could either maintain his current offer or improve it.  When one of the sellers exited, the 
auction concluded.  The current lowest price at the conclusion set the auction price. 
    The winning seller received the auction price and his assigned credit less his unit cost.  The 
buyer received the difference between the quality of winning seller’s good and the total payment 
to the winning seller.  The losing seller received zero earnings.  Over the course of the session, 
subjects could see a complete history of the information that had been revealed to them.  We 
conducted four RFQ sessions with forty-four total subjects; two with 12 subjects each and two 
ten subjects each.  Each RFQ session was completed in less than ninety minutes.  We conducted 
four EBC sessions: The number of participants and periods in each session is given in the 
following table.  All EBC sessions were completed in 105 minutes. 
 
EBC 
Session 
Total 
Periods 
Practice 
Periods 
Sellers Buyers 
1 14 2 10 5 
2 18 2 6 3 
3 16 2 10 5 
4 16 2 8 4 
 
IV. Results on Empirical Economic Performance 
 
    Under Nash equilibrium play, the RFQ is socially efficient, while the EBC better serves the 
buyer’s interest at the expense of efficiency and seller profit.  Contrary to these predictions, in 
experiments, the EBC is more efficient and nominally makes both buyer and seller better off than 
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the RFQ.  The difference between the comparative theoretical and empirical economic 
performances mostly results from play that diverges from the theory in the RFQ experiments. 
    In Table II, we provide statistics for various performance variables in the RFQ and EBC 
auctions.  For both the RFQ and EBC sessions, we provide the sample mean and standard 
deviation for each variable.  Also, for each variable, we provide the z-statistic and its p-value for 
the hypothesis test that the means are the same both auction types. A bold-faced p-value 
indicates the hypothesis is rejected at a five percent level-of-significance. 
    The EBC, not the RFQ, provides a more socially optimal outcome in the experiments.  In over 
84 percent of the EBC auctions, the higher surplus seller wins and the average total realized 
social surplus is 63.25, while the higher surplus seller wins only 79 percent of RFQ auctions and 
the average total realized social surplus is 61.53.  Dividing realized social surplus into its two 
components, we see that the average buyer surplus is about 1.7 percent greater and the average 
seller profit is about 5.2 percent greater in the EBC than in the RFQ.10     
    How buyers and sellers in the EBC benefit from the advantage in average social surplus is 
found by examining the average realized qualities, prices, and costs.  The RFQ auction generates 
a higher quality level than the EBC, 117.69 versus 116.26, but also an increase in costs, 56.15 
versus 53.01.  The net effect of these two differences is the 1.71 advantage in total social surplus 
enjoyed by the EBC.  Also, the average EBC price is 2.52 lower than the RFQ price.  From the 
seller’s perspective, the net effect of the price and cost reductions is a .62 increase in profit in the 
EBC.  From the buyer’s perspective, the reduction in quality is more than offset by the reduction 
in cost, and result in a 1.09 increase in buyer surplus in the EBC. 
    The differences between the relative empirical performances and the game theoretic 
predictions must mean at least one of the auctions is performing differently than its Nash 
equilibrium predictions.  Table III presents the observed and theoretical values of the reported 
performance variables, and hypothesis tests that the observed and theoretical values are the same.  
The theoretical predictions of the RFQ are rejected at the 5 percent level of significance for all 
variables except Avg. Winning Seller’s Quality.  On the other hand, for the EBC, the theoretical 
prediction is only rejected for a single variable.  The observed buyer surplus is significantly less 
than predicted.  Clearly the Nash Equilibrium predictions fare worse for the RFQ than the EBC.  
                                                 
10 However, the improvement in surplus for the buyer and seller in the EBC is not significant according to the z-test. 
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Subjects not using Nash equilibrium strategies must be the source of the theoretical prediction’s 
failures.   
 
V. Analysis of Individual Behavior 
 
    To understand how the equilibrium predictions fail we must identify how subjects’ behavior is 
deviating from the equilibrium strategies.  First, we consider subject behavior in the RFQ 
experiments.  Here we show that sellers offer too much surplus when they receive high-realized 
surplus types and too little surplus when they receive low surplus types.  Also subjects offer 
different surpluses to the buyer for distinct quality-costs pairs that provide the same realized 
surplus.  Regression analysis shows that there are two distinct types of bidders: those who make 
nonlinear bids that are correlated with the Nash bids, and those who submit bids linear in cost 
and quality.  This mixture model explains the why sellers are too “generous” or too “stingy” 
depending upon their realized surplus types.  In the EBC, we see that buyers are too generous 
with their bidding credit assignments and that sellers follow their dominant strategy with one 
caveat; the losing seller on average exits the auction about three dollars before their zero profit 
price.  This bias takes away some of the buyer’s surplus in the EBC. 
V.1 Behavior in the RFQ 
 
    To what extent do subjects’ surplus offers correspond to the Nash Equilibrium surplus offer 
function?  When we plot surplus offers versus realized surplus as in Figure II we don’t find 
evidence that subjects follow the Nash surplus offer function.  We do see at low levels of 
realized surplus subjects will offer less than Nash levels of surplus, while at middle levels of 
realized surplus the surplus offers exceed the Nash Levels, and at high levels of realized surplus 
there is tremendous variation in the level of surplus offers.  The scatter plot of Surplus Offers 
also has several linear bands.  Each of the bands represents a focal amount of profit demanded by 
a seller such as ten, twenty, or thirty dollars.  These bands could be indicative of subjects who 
only ask for a fixed absolute margin independent of their quality.  The presence of these bands 
and the large variation in the surplus offers raises a question; is a subject’s surplus offer 
determined by the difference in quality and cost or more generally by the absolute values of 
quality and costs? 
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    Defining realized surplus as a seller’s type is key to solving for the symmetric Nash 
equilibrium strategy, but assuming a subject’s behavior is solely characterized by his realized 
surplus, or the difference in quality and cost, may be inappropriate.  To understand how subjects 
condition their choices on the absolute levels of cost and quality we consider the difference 
between submitted and Nash bids for different quality-cost pairs.  In Figure III, we present the 
average difference between submitted and Nash bids for different ranges of cost-quality pairs.  
We start by defining 100 equal sized bins that cover the supports of the cost and quality 
variables.  For each bin we select all the instances when a subject drew a cost-quality pair in the 
range of the bin.  For each of these instances, we calculate the deviation of the submitted bid 
from the Nash bid.  We calculate the average of all the deviations in the bin, and the average is 
the reported as the height of the bar of the bin in Figure III. 
    The graphs of these averages reveal systematic patterns.  First, for each level of cost the 
difference between the submitted and Nash bid falls as quality increases.  Evidently, subjects 
don’t fully appreciate the competitive advantage associated with higher quality levels.  Second, 
when costs are high and quality is low – i.e., a low level of realized surplus – submitted bids are 
greater than Nash bids.  This is counter to the Nash equilibrium feature that the lowest type 
demands zero profit.  Third, for low cost-high quality bins the bids are below the Nash levels.  
Finally, if the subjects condition their behavior only on the level of realized surplus, then we 
would expect the average bid deviation to be the same for a constant level of realized surplus.  
Bins corresponding to the same level realized surplus lie on off-diagonal lines of the cost-quality 
range.  Inspection of the bar graphs does not suggest equal bid biases for bins lying on these off-
diagonals.  Hence, subjects’ behavior is not invariant to the absolute levels of cost and quality. 
    Given the significant variation observed when we pool subject behavior, we now ask whether 
subjects decisions are noisy or whether their is systematic heterogeneity in the subjects’ bidding 
rules.  We proceed by allowing for two possibilities; a subject’s bids could either be a linear 
function of cost and quality or correlated with the non-linear Nash bid function.  A linear bid for 
subject i function has the following form: 
pi(ci, vi) = β0 + β1 ci+ β2 vi, 
where the betas are unknown coefficients.  We formulate the nonlinear Nash bid model as 
pi(ci, vi) = γ0 + γ1 p*(ci, vi) , 
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where p*( ) is the Nash bid function.  If a bidder exactly follows the Nash bidding rule, then γ0 = 
0 and γ1 = 1.  The two models allow us to characterize linear bidders and bidders who follow 
non-linear rules that are close to the Nash equilibrium strategy.  We want to ascertain, for each 
subject, whether either of these models is appropriate. 
    We use the J-test of Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) to determine the selection from the two 
non-nested models.  First we imbed the two models into one specification 
pi(ci, vi) = (1- α) [β0 + β1 ci+ β2 vi] + α [γ0 + γ1 p*(ci, vi)]. 
We use OLS to estimate this model.  Then we run two hypothesis tests: α = 0 and α = 1.  There 
are four possible outcomes to this exercise.  First, we could reject both hypotheses and we select 
the larger nesting model.  Second, we could not reject both hypotheses.  This would indicate that 
both models are adequate and that the models are highly co-linear.  Third, we could reject α = 0 
but not α = 1.  In this case we select Nash model.  Finally we could reject α = 1, but not α = 0.  
In this case we select the linear bid model.  Recall the Nash bid function is linear over part of the 
cost-quality range and in this range the two models can correspond.  This can confound the 
identification of which bidding function a subject follows.  Nevertheless, our results allow us to 
make a definitive model assignment for half of the subjects. 
    We apply the J-test to each subject’s data in the RFQ and find substantial heterogeneity in the 
bidding strategies.  In Table III, we report for each subject the model selected, the estimated 
parameters of the selected model, and the r-square statistic.  For twenty-two of the forty-four 
subjects we are able to select a single model.  Six subjects follow the Nash bidding model and 
sixteen follow the linear bidding model.  The J-test selects both models for ten subjects.  For 
these subjects we report the coefficient estimates for the model with the cost, quality and Nash 
bid parameters.  Inspection of the regression results reveals some classic signs of 
multicollinearity: a high r-square, insignificant coefficients, and coefficients with the wrong sign.  
For these ten subjects the two models are too similar to differentiate.  For the remaining twelve 
subjects, we reject both the linear and Nash model in favor of the nested model.  Here we report 
the regression results for the nested regression and again observe the signs of multicollinearity. 
    The J-test exercise demonstrates there are large contingencies of both non-linear Nash bidders 
and linear bidders.  The presence of linear bidders leads to inefficient auction outcomes; linear 
bidding rules leads to low prices for high quality goods.  Consequently, the Buyer’s surplus is 
significantly higher and the Seller’s profit is significantly lower than under the Nash equilibrium. 
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V.2 Behavior in the EBC 
 
    Subject behavior in the EBC is adheres closer to the game theoretic predictions than it does in 
the RFQ.  Again, a seller has a weakly dominant strategy in the auction: exit only when the price 
falls below cost minus bidding credit.  Subjects do follow this prescription with a caveat.  The 
losing seller exits the auction, on average, three dollars above his threshold price.  The buyer’s 
Nash strategy is not as apparent as the seller’s.  Most of the time the Buyers do assign non-zero 
bidding credits, but their assignments are on average too generous.  The combination of sellers 
exiting the auction slightly early and the buyer’s assigning overly generous bidding credits leads 
to greater efficiency and seller profit than predicted. 
    How closely do sellers adhere to the dominant strategy?  In Figure IV, we provide a histogram 
of the difference between the losing seller’s exit price and his dominant strategy exit price.  Most 
losing sellers exit slightly above their zero profit prices.  Specifically, over 81 percent of the 
deviations are between zero and four – the average price and auction close at was close to sixty-
four.  In contrast, only 2.4 percent of the losing sellers exit after the zero profit price and only 
three out of 248 auction winners lose money.  Sellers clearly understand the dominant strategy 
and exit close to, but not below, their zero profit prices.  We conjecture that the tediousness of 
the English auction is responsible for the early exit behavior.11 
    The Buyers’ bidding credit assignments greatly vary and on average are more generous than 
the optimal bidding credits.  First, approximately twenty-five percent of the time the buyer does 
not utilize the bidding credits to give an advantage to the high quality seller.  Specifically, in 
over eighteen percent of the auctions the buyer assigns the same bidding credit to both sellers, 
and in almost seven percent of the auctions the buyer assigns a larger bidding credit to the lower 
quality.  In these cases the buyer is certainly not using the bidding credits to manage quality 
differences.  At the other end of the spectrum, in almost six percent of the auctions the difference 
in the assigned bidding credits is equal to the difference in quality.  Here, while the buyer is 
ensuring the best seller is selected, he is not capturing any additional surplus over the Nash 
equilibrium outcome of the RFQ.  In Figure V, we provide a scatter plot of the difference in 
                                                 
11 This raises a potential issue with the Nash equilibrium analysis;  if the subjects were actually discounting their 
auction payoffs, then our open outcry implementation of the auction allows alternative equilibrium involving jump 
bidding as discussed in Isaac, Salmon, and Zillante (2002). 
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bidding credit versus the difference in quality, a graph of the optimal bidding credit rule, and a 
graph of the OLS trend line.  The trend line is above the optimal assignment line, but the OLS 
trend also has a low r-square that reflects highly variable Buyer behavior.  Although the EBC has 
a transparent dominant strategy for sellers, the optimal bidding assignment rule proves elusive to 
the buyers.  However, as seen in Figure V, the majority of the time the buyers do use 
discriminatory assignments.   
    The experimental results provide an assessment of the impact the choice of auction has on the 
effectiveness of procurement activities.  The empirical performance of the RFQ leaves 
opportunities for other mechanisms to improve upon the status quo.  As our experiments show, 
the EBC produces greater total surplus and/or better serves the buyer’s interest depending upon 
the buyer’s objective and rule for assigning bidding credits. 
 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
 
    In this paper, we assess two alternative ways enterprises can procure differentiated goods.  The 
first alternative is the traditional method of request for quote.  We show that under a symmetric 
Nash equilibrium the RFQ is an efficient mechanism. The second alternative is an English 
auction in which the buyer can assign bidding credits to the sellers based upon the qualities of 
the goods offered. This mechanism has a Nash equilibrium in which a seller has a transparent 
weakly dominant strategy, and the buyer has an optimal bidding credit assignment, which under 
compensates the high quality supplier for his quality advantage. This discriminatory policy 
improves the buyer’s welfare over what she receives in the RFQ at the expense of social 
efficiency and seller profit. However, in our experiments, we find the EBC outperforms the RFQ 
for both buyers and sellers because (1) sellers don’t follow the symmetric Nash strategy in the 
RFQ and because (2) buyers assign overly generous bidding credits in the EBC. 
    The transformation of how enterprises procure goods and services is one promise the 
emergence of e-commerce has actually fulfilled.  Part of this transformation is an increase in the 
use of English auction variations. In practice, these English auctions for procurement of 
differentiated goods are not equivalent to the English auctions typically studied by economists. 
Specifically an English auction does not determine the supplier; the auction only sets each 
participating seller’s price.  After the auction, the buyer selects the winning seller and pays that 
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seller his exit price from the auction. This is how implementations of English procurement 
auctions manage product differentiation — Kinney (2000).  
The EBC is a potentially attractive alternative to current procurement English auction 
practices.  In the current business use of English auctions, a seller no longer has a transparent 
dominant strategy and, more importantly, a buyer can’t credibly commit to a discriminatory 
policy when they select a seller after the auction. Evaluating the non-price attributes of goods 
after the auction, the buyer is less likely to use a discriminatory policy.  This would require 
sometimes selecting a seller who does not provide the best combination of price and quality. In 
the EBC, the evaluation of quality prior to auction is an opportunity to pre-commit to a 
discriminatory policy, which doesn’t suffer from the credibility problem of exercising the policy 
after the auction.  
Another promising application of the EBC and its strategic transparency to the supplier is its 
use to manage the longer term procurer supplier relationship. As noted by Jap (2007), current 
applications of the Reverse auction alienate this relationship and can lead to worse procurement 
performance. This study demonstrates that smart use of the EBC can lead to making both the 
suppliers and buyer better off. This comes from the fact in the various forms of procurement 
auctions without transparent dominant strategies, bidders fail to adopt Nash equilibrium bidding 
strategies and lead to inefficient market outcomes. EBC can allow one to recover these lost gains 
from exchange. 
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Table I: Nash Equilibrium Predictions for the RFQ and EBC 
Auction
% of 
Efficient 
Outcomes 
Avg. 
Winning 
Seller Quality 
Avg. Auction 
Price 
Avg. 
Winning 
Seller Cost 
Avg. Buyer 
Surplus 
Avg. Winning 
Seller Profit 
Avg. Realized 
Social Surplus
RFQ 100% 117.90 71.17 54.65 46.74 16.52 63.26 
EBC 83.41% 115.55 66.79 53.37 48.76 13.41 62.17 
 
 
% of Efficient Avg. Realized Avg. Winning Avg. Auction Avg. Winning Avg. Buyer Avg. Winning
Auction Outcomes Social Surplus Seller Quality Price Seller Cost Surplus Seller Profit
RFQ 79% 61.53 117.69 68.37 56.16 49.32 12.21
Stand. Dev. 0.407 12.67 8.18 9.39 10.64 9.86 8.33
EBC 84.27% 63.25 116.26 65.85 53.01 50.41 12.83
Stand. Dev. 0.64 3.56 2.86 3.06 3.26 3.14 2.89
m RFQ -m EBC -5.27% -1.71 1.43 2.52 3.14 -1.09 -0.62
z -stat -2.01 -2.00 2.37 3.45 4.74 -1.25 -0.94
F (z ) 0.022 0.023 0.991 1.000 1.000 0.106 0.173
Table II. Empirical Auction Performance: RFQ versus EBC
% of Efficient Avg. Realized Avg. Winning Avg. Auction Avg. Winning Avg. Buyer Avg. Winning
Auction Outcomes Social Surplus Seller Quality Price Seller Cost Surplus Seller Profit
Theoretical 100% 63.26 117.90 71.17 54.65 46.74 16.52
Observed 79% 61.53 117.69 68.37 56.16 49.32 12.21
Stand. Dev. 0.407 12.67 8.18 9.39 10.64 9.86 8.33
Z-stat -17.092 -4.51 -0.85 -9.91 4.69 8.69 -17.16
F (z ) 0.000 0.000 0.198 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000
Theoretical 83.41% 62.17 115.55 66.79 53.37 48.76 13.41
Observed 84.27% 63.25 116.26 65.85 53.01 50.41 12.83
Stand. Dev. 0.638 3.56 2.86 3.06 3.26 3.14 2.89
Z-stat 0.374 1.40 1.29 -1.40 -0.61 2.01 -0.94
F (z ) 0.646 0.919 0.902 0.081 0.270 0.978 0.173
n= 248
n =1100
EBC
Table III: Auction Performance: Theoretic Predictions and Empirical Measurements
RFQ
Tabel IV: Estimated Bidding Models with J -test Selection Criteria For each Subject
Subject Intercept Cost Quality NE Price R-Square Model Selected
1 -4.10 - - 1.04 0.85 Nash Price
2 -8.11 - - 1.08 0.64 Nash Price
3 14.10 - - 0.78 0.62 Nash Price
4 9.10 - - 0.91 0.54 Nash Price
5 13.80 - - 0.79 0.54 Nash Price
6 24.19 - - 0.66 0.53 Nash Price
7 5.29 0.74 0.15 - 0.94 Linear Cost and Bid
8 -1.69 0.92 0.12 - 0.93 Linear Cost and Bid
9 -2.25 0.68 0.27 - 0.88 Linear Cost and Bid
10 0.05 0.89 0.10 - 0.85 Linear Cost and Bid
11 10.20 0.66 0.19 - 0.82 Linear Cost and Bid
12 8.28 0.68 0.21 - 0.81 Linear Cost and Bid
13 9.54 0.76 0.11 - 0.81 Linear Cost and Bid
14 12.44 0.81 0.08 - 0.77 Linear Cost and Bid
15 2.20 0.65 0.26 - 0.75 Linear Cost and Bid
16 12.88 0.86 0.02 - 0.67 Linear Cost and Bid
17 13.82 0.61 0.22 - 0.65 Linear Cost and Bid
18 10.80 0.63 0.18 - 0.64 Linear Cost and Bid
19 6.93 0.61 0.23 - 0.62 Linear Cost and Bid
20 18.35 0.91 0.05 - 0.55 Linear Cost and Bid
21 18.45 0.67 0.14 - 0.47 Linear Cost and Bid
22 38.65 0.59 0.05 - 0.33 Linear Cost and Bid
23 -4.05 0.40 -0.06 0.75 0.93 Both Models Selected
24 4.43 -0.01 -0.15 1.12 0.87 Both Models Selected
25 12.30 -1.20 -0.71 2.89 0.86 Both Models Selected
26 -5.12 -0.63 -0.26 2.03 0.85 Both Models Selected
27 1.68 0.20 -0.07 0.88 0.84 Both Models Selected
28 3.19 -1.48 -0.60 3.15 0.83 Both Models Selected
29 35.84 -0.45 -0.66 1.86 0.83 Both Models Selected
30 12.41 -0.89 -0.36 2.12 0.70 Both Models Selected
31 40.41 -0.31 -0.45 1.39 0.60 Both Models Selected
32 57.49 -0.75 -0.60 1.76 0.53 Both Models Selected
33 -11.02 0.08 0.01 1.00 0.82 Neither Model Selected
34 15.39 0.33 0.01 0.54 0.79 Neither Model Selected
35 -3.13 0.41 0.49 0.06 0.71 Neither Model Selected
36 -2.15 0.30 -0.02 0.77 0.70 Neither Model Selected
37 -7.04 0.19 0.30 0.53 0.67 Neither Model Selected
38 24.90 -0.78 -0.49 2.14 0.58 Neither Model Selected
39 8.10 -0.17 -0.02 1.04 0.57 Neither Model Selected
40 36.39 0.23 0.06 0.25 0.41 Neither Model Selected
41 19.83 -0.71 -0.36 1.95 0.33 Neither Model Selected
42 43.29 0.16 0.03 0.33 0.26 Neither Model Selected
43 37.00 0.43 -0.05 0.31 0.21 Neither Model Selected
44 27.52 0.64 0.48 -0.63 0.12 Neither Model Selected
(Bold face indicates t -test does reject coefficient is zero; 50 observations for each subject)
  
Figure 1: Graphs of RFQ Nash Equilibrium Strategies 
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Figure II: Surplus Offered
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Figure III: The Average Difference Between the Actual Bid and the 
Predicted 
Bid for Different Cost-Quality Types
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Figure IV: Devation of Losing Seller's Exit Price From 
Dominant Strategy Exit Price
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Figure V: Differences in Assigned Bidding Credits versus 
Differences in Quality
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